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1. INTRODUCTION
Energy trade between the United States and Canada has averaged
ten to fourteen billion dollars annually over the last few years.' This
represents approximately ten percent of the total trade in goods be-
tween the two nations, which have the largest trade relationship in the
world.2
The policies now governing energy trade, not only between Ca-
nada and the United States, but also within each country, contrast with
those of the 1960s and 1970s when energy trade was subject to a vari-
ety of interventionist and protectionist policies. The Canada/United
States Free-Trade Agreement (FTA)3 is a landmark in the commit-
ment of both countries to market-oriented trade policies and the
achievement of fair and free trade between the two countries.4 In addi-
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1 The figures used herein are based on data provided by Statistics Canada, Exter-
nal Trade Div. and by the Energy Information Agency, U.S. Dep't of Energy.
2 In 1987, the two-way trade in goods and services totalled $160.1 billion, about
$130 billion of which was in goods alone.
' Department of External Affairs, The Canada/United States Free-Trade Agree-
ment, done Dec. 10, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter FTA]. The FTA
was signed and ratified in both countries in late 1988 and came into force on January
1, 1989.
" For a general review of the FTA, see Battram & Lock, The CanadalUnited
States Free-Trade Agreement and Trade in Energy, 9 ENERGY L.J. 327. See also N.
Schultz, The Energy Provisions of the Canada-United States Free-Trade Agreement
(Oct. 24-28, 1988) (address to the International Scientific Forum on Energy Chal-
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tion to its substantive provisions, the FTA introduces dispute resolution
mechanisms, including specific mechanisms to deal with energy mat-
ters, that will influence both domestic competitive behavior and the
evolution of free trade under the FTA itself.5
The development of the energy provisions of the FTA was the
culmination of several years of work in both countries toward signifi-
cant deregulation of the oil and gas industries and, more recently and
modestly, of electricity production. The establishment of market-ori-
ented energy policies affected not only domestic trade but also has led to
the adoption of market-oriented standards for Canada/U.S. energy
trade. The FTA solidifies this progress and marks a point of departure
for future developments in trade between the United States and
Canada.
The FTA energy provisions affirm and expand principles of eq-
uity and openness in international trade found in the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).6 The FTA also affirms existing
GATT concepts of fair competition in international trade regarding
dumping and subsidies, although a process and timetable is established
for the development of common standards for each country's antidump-
ing and countervailing duty practices.'
Energy trade between the two countries is influenced at the na-
tional level by the policies of three different types of government agen-
cies: those responsible for foreign policy and international trade; those
responsible for national energy policy; and agencies responsible for en-
ergy regulation specifically, principally the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) and Canada's National Energy Board (NEB).8
The interaction between these agencies, and its effect on cross-border
competition, was illustrated by FERC's 1986-87 "as billed" decisions
on the pricing treatment of Canadian gas imports under FERC's regu-
lation of U.S. pipelines.9
The FTA leaves the antitrust laws of each country intact. This
result is not surprising because antitrust laws are designed to protect
and foster fair competition, which is one of the objectives of the FTA.
lenges, Washington, D.C.).
I See Battram & Lock, supra note 4, at 371-82 (explaining the dispute resolution
mechanisms contained in the FTA).
" FTA, supra note 3, 27 I.L.M. at 343.
7 Id. at 386.
8 This complexity is compounded by the considerable regulatory authority of Ca-
nadian provinces and U.S. states over these energy industries. Battram & Lock, supra
note 4, at 340-42.
9 Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 37 F.E.R.C. 1 61,215 (1986), clarified, Natural Gas
Pipeline Co., 39 F.E.R.C. 1 61,218 (1987).
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This article will examine and compare the recent development of
market-oriented energy policies in both countries and the growing im-
portance of antitrust issues, as regulators in both countries rely increas-
ingly on market forces to discipline economic behavior in the oil, natu-
ral gas and electricity industries. The complexity of developing and
enforcing effective standards of competition" ° in the regulated energy
context in each country is discussed, as are some possible implications
for the international trade relationship under the FTA.
2. PROTECTING GROWING COMPETITION IN REGULATED U.S.
ENERGY MARKETS11
2.1. Introduction: The Institutional Structure
As the oil, natural gas, and electricity industries in the United
States have become partly deregulated, 2 two trends have become evi-
dent. The first is a growing tendency of each industry, under pressure
from competition, to restructure, both horizontally and vertically.
The second is the development of competitive pressures on markets
hitherto dominated by strong, state-sanctioned monopolies. Deregula-
tion, however, has permeated all segments of these industries.18 Hence,
regulators face immediate challenges on two fronts. The first challenge
is nurturing developing competition in some sectors of an industry and
protecting it from monopoly power pervasive in other sectors. This is
essentially an antitrust problem in a new context. The second chal-
lenge, which arises in sectors still subject to significant regulation, such
as natural gas pipelines and electric utilities, is the problem that state-
sanctioned monopolies are no longer strong, but rather weak or
rivalrous.14 This poses a challenge to the traditional rate regulation
10 The term "standards of competition" is the term typically used in Canada to
mean "antitrust."
11 The authors acknowledge and are grateful for the helpful comments on this
part of the paper by Jade A. Eaton, Esq., Newman & Holtzinger, P.C., Washington,
D.C.; Professor Richard A. Pierce, Columbia University Law School; and Donald A.
Kaplan, Esq., Special Litigation Counsel, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice.
- Recognizing that major functions of these industries, especially electricity and
natural gas, will probably continue to be dominated by state-sanctioned monopolies for
the foreseeable future, many U.S. regulators prefer to refer to efforts to introduce more
competition into these industries as "regulatory reform" rather than "deregulation."
"Deregulation" will be used herein as a convenient shorthand to cover all developments
in this direction.
" Some level of economic regulation of the transportation or transmission function
is the feature common to the oil, natural gas, and electricity industries.
14 See C. Stalon, Economic Regulation and Discrimination When Regulation
and Competition Are Mixed, in INSTITUTE FOR STUDY OF REGULATION, Proceedings,
13th Annual Rate Symposium, St. Louis, Mo., 245 (1987). See also source cited infra
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model because regulators have relied on the monopoly power of the
regulated entities to achieve important regulatory objectives.
Both challenges raise basic questions as to the continued viability
of traditional approaches to regulation. These questions are currently
the focus of industry-specific regulatory reform efforts. They will not
be the subject of this part. Instead, we will identify more overt antitrust
concerns confronting economic regulators, such as FERC and state
public utility commissions (PUCs), and confronting the traditional anti-
trust enforcement agencies, such as the Antitrust Division of the De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
An initial issue is essentially institutional. Where should the pri-
mary responsibility for assuring compliance with antitrust standards
lie-with regulatory agencies, traditional antitrust agencies, or some
combination of the two? Current practice appears to be evolving, hap-
hazardly, towards the last of these, but it is not clear that this combina-
tion will be effective if subjected to pressure.
The traditional antitrust enforcement agencies, the DOJ and the
FTC, while steeped in antitrust expertise in unregulated markets, are
less able to monitor on a day-to-day basis complex and distinctive mar-
ket developments in regulated industries, or to monitor the rapid and
complex realignment of regulation where competition is being intro-
duced. Moreover, as the dichotomy between tightly-regulated industries
and free markets breaks down, many novel and unresolved antitrust
and regulatory issues arise.
Nevertheless, the DOJ has sporadically intervened, usually with
limited resources, in generic FERC proceedings in the oil pipeline and
natural gas areas. As yet, however, the DOJ has not intervened signifi-
cantly in the more time-consuming and demanding, but critical, case-
by-case implementation of generic decisions, such as FERC's mid-
1980s natural gas initiatives, Orders 380, 436, and 500."5 For instance,
the traditional antitrust agencies did not intervene before FERC in an
note 98.
15 Order No. 380, Elimination of Variable Costs from Certain Natural Gas Pipe-
lines Minimum Commodity Bill Provisions, 18 C.F.R. § 154.11 (1985)(originally ap-
pearing at 49 Fed. Reg. 22,778); Order No. 436, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines
After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (1985)(codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 C.F.R.); Order No. 500, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines
After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 18 C.F.R. §§ 2.104-05, 284.8-.10 (1988)(originally
appearing at 52 Fed. Reg. 30,334).
However, the DOJ did file comments in the order 436 rulemaking process itself,
and in a related rulemaking proceeding concerning the relationship between natural gas
pipelines and their marketing affiliates. Inquiry into Alleged Anti-Competitive Prac-
tices Related to Marketing Affiliates of Interstate Pipelines, 3 F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs.
(1988).
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important merger proposal by two major Pacific Northwest electric
utilities, for which FERC subsequently conditioned approval on the
merged company's accepting stringent transmission access conditions
designed to prevent potential abuses of monopoly power in wholesale
markets. 6
FTC intervention has also been very limited in the major areas of
energy regulation. However, it has been expanding its "competition ad-
vocacy" program to "persuade organs of federal, state and local govern-
ment of the virtues of competition and the costs of regulation.""' Much
of this effort has been directed at opposing state legislation that would
limit retail gasoline marketing by integrated oil companies., More re-
cently, the FTC has filed comments with FERC "admonish[ing] it to
discount competitor opposition to [pipeline] certification applications"
on the grounds of potential non-price predation.' 9
The FTC's principal focus, however, is currently upon its more
traditional antitrust role of reviewing natural gas pipeline merger pro-
posals.2" Some of the general dissension over merger review standards
and enforcement under the Reagan Administration spilt over into the
natural gas merger area, where the rapidly-evolving regulated markets
pose a special problem for merger oversight.
One can draw the tentative conclusion from this pattern of anti-
trust enforcement that the DOJ and the FTC recognize the special ex-
pertise necessary for effective antitrust policy in regulated industries.
They have tended to assume, and indeed the DOJ has advocated, that
the economic regulators will themselves play a major role in developing
and implementing such policy, especially in areas where resource con-
straints limit their own ability to do so. The DOJ and the FTC prefer
to intervene selectively in regulatory proceedings to help mold regula-
tory policy, rather than to undertake the formidable analysis necessary
to develop their own antitrust policies for each of the industries con-
cerned. Where their traditional enforcement functions have been trig-
gered, as in merger reviews, their role has been largely reactive and
their level of scrutiny has varied.2'
16 Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. % 61,095 (1988).
"7 See T. Calvani, Remarks at the Third Annual ABA Conference on Canada/
U.S. Trade in Energy 153, 158 (May 18-20, 1988) [hereinafter Calvani].
18 Id.
19 See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
20 Calvani, supra note 17, at 154-58.
21 The level of scrutiny appears to be influenced by both the general approach to
antitrust enforcement of the administration in power and by the perceptions of the
enforcement agencies as to how effective oversight is at the regulatory level. For in-
stance, in cases involving mergers of electric utilities, where FERC has actively been
exercising its broad review authority under Section 203 of the Federal Power Act, 16
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On the other hand, the economic regulatory agencies such as
FERC do not have special antitrust expertise. However, they are famil-
iar with the structure and characteristics of the industries they regulate
and the pricing models for the economic regulation they impose. A full
understanding of the latter tends to be critical, for instance, in evaluat-
ing claims of price discrimination.2 Typically, these agencies do not
view themselves as having an antitrust enforcement role. This is cer-
tainly the case with FERC. 3 However, the courts have generally ruled
that FERC must take into account the policies underlying the antitrust
laws in performing its responsibilities.24 Moreover, economic regulatory
agencies such as FERC operate under statutory mandates of pertinence
to competition, such as those proscribing "undue discrimination" in
utility rates and practices.2" These mandates resemble antitrust stan-
dards in some respects, and they suggest a prophylactic antitrust role
for such regulatory agencies. 6 The courts have been pressing FERC
for over a decade to evaluate utility rate filings for wholesale electric
requirements customers27 in terms of their potential to create a "price
squeeze" for these customers.2" Over the last two years, FERC has re-
U.S.C. § 824b (1982), action by the enforcement agencies has been limited to a low-
involvement DOJ intervention in one case. In contrast, in natural gas merger cases,
where FERC authority is limited, the FTC has assumed a significant antitrust enforce-
ment role.
22 See, e.g., Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 35 F.E.R.C. [1 61,231 (1986) (Stalon,
Comm'r, dissenting) (explaining why an individual transportation certificate granted
pursuant to the Natural Gas Act § 7(c) was unduly discriminatory and not in the
public interest, and developing standards of "due" and "undue," discrimination). See
also infra part 2.2.1.
23 California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962); Connecticut Light & Power Co., 8
F.E.R.C. 61,187, 61,653 (1979). See also Head, Antitrust Analysis and Regulation:
The Role of an Antitrust Adviser at FERC, 2 REGULATORY REFORM 9 (1988).
24 See supra note 23. See also FPC v. Conway Corp., 42 U.S. 271, 279 (1976);
Gulf States Utilities v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 758-59 (1973); Maryland People's Counsel
v. FERC, 761 F.2d 768, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399
F.2d 953, 959-61 (D.C. Cir. 1968). This duty has long been explicitly recognized by
the FERC. See, e.g., Connecticut Light & Power Co. 8 F.E.R.C. 1 61,187 (1979).
25 See, e.g., Natural Gas Act, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 717d (1982); Federal Power Act,
§§ 205, 206, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e (1982); Interstate Commerce Act, §§ 3, 10, 49
U.S.C. §§ 1, 3(1), 10(4) (1982).
26 In Gulf States, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Power Commission
(FPC) (FERC's predecessor) should consider antitrust and anti-competitive issues
before authorizing issuances of securities under section 204 of the Federal Power Act in
order to establish "a first line of defense against those competitive practices that might
later be the subject of antitrust proceedings." 411 U.S. at 760. See also Mishawaka v.
Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 560 F.2d 1314, 1323 (7th Cir. 1977) (interpreting the
ruling in Gulf States).
27 While owning distribution systems and, hence, technically, utilities, these enti-
ties are typically dependent upon other utilities for all or part of their power supply
needs.
2 See, e.g., FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271 (1976) (holding that the FPC's
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sponded by addressing price squeezes more explicitly and has placed
greater reliance on traditional antitrust analysis.2"
Moreover, the increased evidence of competition in electricity
wholesale markets and FERC's administrative efforts to realign the
natural gas markets,3 0 which have become partially deregulated under
the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978,-" has led to a new awareness of
the relevance of antitrust scrutiny in the course of economic regulation.
It has also lead to some recognition of the need to enhance FERC's
antitrust expertise. 2
Thus, over the last two years, FERC has utilized antitrust stan-
dards in meeting its broader "public interest" charge in its regulation of
rates and corporate structures of regulated entities. 3 In addition, the
FTC and the DOJ have a propensity for intervening in the regulatory
arena to foster competition. Despite overlapping responsibilities and the
jurisdiction to review a petition to set aside or reduce a public utility's wholesale elec-
tric rate increase permits consideration of the utility's alleged purpose to forestall its
customers from competing with it on the retail level); Boroughs of Ellwood City v.
FERC, 731 F.2d 959 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that the decision not to ameliorate a
proven price squeeze ordinarily must be based on FERC's determination that the anti-
competitive effect of the "price squeeze" on the wholesale customer and retail competi-
tor is outweighed by the effect of a remedy on the supplying utility's financial viability
and its ability to serve all its customers). See also Mid-Tex Elec. Coop. v. FERC, 773
F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that FERC's reasons for adopting a rule allowing
electric utilities to include in their rate bases amounts equal to 50% of their investment
in construction work in progress were valid, but also holding that FERC's considera-
tion of potential "price squeeze" and "double whammy" effects of the rule was incon-
sistent and inadequate; thus, FERC had to reconsider the rule), petition for review
granted, 864 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding in part that FERC's decision to
address regulatory "price squeeze" created by disparity in treatment of costs of con-
struction work in progress by state regulatory agencies and FERC was reasonable, but
that it was unreasonable to place the burden of proof on a wholesale customer seeking
preliminary relief from anticompetitive "price squeeze").
29 Southern California Edison Co., 40 F.E.R.C. 62,147 (1987). But see 46
F.E.R.C. T 61,300 (1989) (Stalon, Comm'r, dissenting in part). Moreover, the DOJ
has contended that FERC's efforts to remedy a price squeeze should be more narrowly
focused on those price squeeze situations revealing predatory intent and not on all situ-
ations where differences in FERC and state regulatory treatment lead to a price
squeeze. DOJ's Reply Comments, Electric Utilities, Construction Work in Progress
and Anticompetitive Implications, III F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,689, 30,692 (1986)
(F.E.R.C. No. RM86-6) [hereinafter DOJ Price Squeeze Comments].
30 FERC Order Nos. 380, 436, 500, supra note 15.
31 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-432 (1978).
32 FERC, for instance, created a new position of Visiting Fellow and Special Ad-
visor for Antitrust Analysis. For a perspective on the significance of this step, see Head,
supra note 23, at 9. Another indication of this recognition is an increased emphasis on
hiring economists with antitrust expertise in FERC's newly-named Office of Economic
Policy.
33 Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. T 61,095 (1988); Tucson Elec. Power
Co., 44 F.E.R.C. 61,441 (1988); Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 46 F.E.R.C. % 61,006
(1988). See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
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potential for policy conflicts between the DOJ, the FTC, and FERC,
the executive and legislative branches of the federal government have
not yet recognized a need for a cohesive strategy towards antitrust com-
pliance as competition develops in the regulated energy industries. This
overlapping presents two dangers: regulatory "overkill" or "layering"
when several agencies act,34 and potential vacuums when none act.
Both of these dangers could hamper effective antitrust monitoring and
effective economic regulation.35 Where Congress has intervened, appar-
ently motivated to fill vacuums, it has often achieved regulatory
layering. 6
However, the executive branch has several means of influencing
competition policy at regulatory agencies such as FERC: statutory
mandate, appointment of commissioners and DOJ or FTC intervention
in regulatory proceedings. In practice, the alert exercise of the last
function can raise issues FERC has overlooked and avoid most regula-
tory vacuums. Moreover, these agencies, through the exercise of their
discretion not to prosecute or investigate, can generally avoid "layer-
ing." Hence, the dangers of vacuums and regulatory layering should
not be overstated. Moreover, for the executive branch to impose a for-
mal mechanism to assure policy cohesion would require reconciling the
quite different functions of all of these agencies and raise questions as
to the "independent" status of FERC.
From this brief institutional survey, several increasingly impor-
tant, and as yet unanswered, questions emerge:
(1) Can the growing tendency of FERC to use antitrust standards in its
broad evaluation of "the public interest" in regulation, or in setting
"just and reasonable" rates, comfortably coexist with the increasingly
important and complex duty of the DOJ and the FTC to assure com-
pliance with the antitrust laws as competition grows in these indus-
tries? Congress has generally assumed it can. 7 FERC's mandate,
34 Both the FTC and FERC appear sensitive to this danger. See Calvani, supra
note 17, at 276-77; Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C 1 61,095 (1988).
" There is, however, some evidence that the antitrust and regulatory agencies
tend to avoid obvious omissions in governmental oversight through some mutual aware-
ness of the roles each will play in an individual case. For instance, the DOJ has as-
sumed only a limited intervention role in electric merger cases where FERC has broad
authority, and, where the reverse is true in the natural gas company merger area, the
FTC has assumed a significant enforcement role. See supra note 21.
"' Prime examples are section 213(b) of the National Energy Policy Conservation
Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 8214 (1982), and section 13 of the Electric Consumers Pro-
tection Act of 1986, 16 U.S.C. § 803(h) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Both seemingly add
little of value to existing antitrust compliance mechanisms.
37 The courts have typically declined to find an implied repeal of the antitrust
laws in the regulatory statutes. A few of the statutes explicitly address the relationship
of the regulatory regime to the antitrust laws. E.g., Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 §
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broader than that of the antitrust enforcement agencies, requires bal-
ancing various public interest criteria of which competition is but one,
however important. By its nature, economic regulation implies the
sanctioning of potentially-anticompetitive practices in some circum-
stances. Indeed, one role of FERC is to weigh the respective merits of
competitive and monopoly power in any given area of the industries it
regulates against the yardstick of some higher norm, such as economic
efficiency. 8 In contrast, the specific mandate of the DOJ and the FTC
is to foster competition. The potential for overlap and for conflict in
different applications of pro-competitive standards, and for a more di-
rect confrontation between pro-competition policies and regulatory
standards, is obvious. However, this potential also should not be over-
stated. In general, the goals of the antitrust laws and of economic regu-
lation are complementary; both seek the result that maximizes economic
efficiency. True conflicts are unlikely to arise except in a narrow range
of circumstances where the DOJ and the FTC disagree with the eco-
nomic regulators as to the best means to achieve economic efficiency, or
where a regulator seeks to further regulatory goals other than economic
efficiency. Clear inter-institutional relationships, especially as to pri-
mary or exclusive jurisdiction, and clear expressions of legislative intent
can help to resolve such conflicts.
(2) Can one draw an appropriate line between the antitrust enforce-
ment role of the DOJ and the FTC and FERC's broader regulatory
role, which includes enhancing pro-competitive structures and conduct?
(3) To what degree can FERC, the DOJ, and the FTC afford to focus
on regulation of conduct as opposed to the creation of structures provid-
ing pro-competitive incentives?
(4) What role should FERC play if the antitrust enforcement agencies
abdicate their responsibilities, and vice versa? In other industries, such
as telecommunications, judicial industry restructuring initiatives have
not been entirely successful. Arguably, they should have been handled
by a regulatory agency more alert to and familiar with the industry.
Given the rapid evolution of competition in energy sectors that are
still regulated, the next few years should bring more conscious efforts to
confront these questions. We may see the evolution of antitrust doctrine
more tailored to the economic regulation area than that developed by
the courts for unregulated markets.
304(e), 15 U.S.C. § 3364(e) (1982).
38 See Southern California Edison Co., 46 F.E.R.C. 61,853 (1989) (Stalon,
Comm'r, dissenting).
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2.2. Substantive Antitrust Doctrine in Economic Regulation
The ensuing discussion will identify some emerging antitrust con-
cepts in regulated markets. Due to space limitations, this article will
focus on just four areas of concern, and will do no more than identify
the principal issues in each.
2.2.1. Price Discrimination and Price Squeeze
Until recently, FERC (and its predecessor, the Federal Power
Commission (FPC)) has concentrated its price discrimination efforts in
attempting to apply the antitrust doctrine of "price squeeze"39 to the
FERC's wholesale electric ratemaking jurisdiction. That effort was ini-
tiated in response to a 1976 Supreme Court decision, Federal Power
Commission v. Conway Corp.,4 which rejected an FPC claim that it
had no jurisdiction to address "price squeeze" claims. The Court held
that FERC was required to consider the potential anticompetitive effect
of a price squeeze in determining whether wholesale rates were "just
and reasonable" and that FERC had the discretion to push wholesale
rates to the lower end of a "zone of reasonableness" to remedy a price
squeeze.41 Taking advantage of this discretion, FERC first determines
the "just and reasonable" rate or zone42 on "cost-based" principles, and
then examines allegations of price squeeze.
After a decade-long struggle to develop a methodology for analyz-
ing price squeeze, which initially received tolerance and then growing
impatience4 ' from the reviewing courts, FERC finally made a major
price squeeze finding in 1987. In Southern California Edison Co.,
FERC required the supplying company to reduce its rates and to make
refunds.44 In dissent, Commissioner Stalon criticized FERC's method-
ology for determining price discrimination, the first major element of a
" United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 436-38 (2d
Cir. 1945) (applying a "transfer price" test to identify price squeeze as existing when a
vertically integrated entity could not purchase at its own wholesale rates and still real-
ize a profit at its own retail rates, that price would injure wholesale customers who are
its retail competitors). See Illinois Cities of Bethany v. FERO, 670 F.2d 187, 189 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (adopting the test advanced in Alcoa).
40 426 U.S. 271 (1976).
41 Id. See also Illinois Cities of Bethany, 670 F.2d at 191 (emphasizing FERC's
broad discretion in the "inexact science" of ratemaking).
42 A "zone of reasonableness" is based on the company's rate of return on equity,
the element of the "cost of service" as to which the most regulatory discretion is
exercised.
41 E.g., Boroughs of Ellwood City v. FERC, 731 F.2d 959, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(vacating a FERC decision not to remedy a price squeeze, and describing FERC's
decision as "illogical" and "irreconcilib[le]" with the "very purpose" of the doctrine).
44 40 F.E.R.C. 62,147 (1987).
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price squeeze finding.45 He argued that this methodology is fundamen-
tally flawed because it is likely to increase the obstacles to competition
where competition can be constructive, and at the same time increase
pressures for competition in areas where regulatory policy has tradi-
tionally encouraged, partly on economic efficiency grounds, tight limits
on competition.46
The price squeeze doctrine applies to a special form of price dis-
crimination that emanates from the dual regulatory status of fully-inte-
grated utilities operating under both state retail and federal wholesale
ratemaking jurisdiction. Moreover, its application has been limited to
wholesale electric "requirements" rates, where competition is not
viewed as a major element in regulatory oversight. 7 Indeed, it is the
very lack of competitive supply options for "captive" requirements cus-
tomers48 that typically justifies "cost-based" rate regulation in the first
place. Wholesale requirements service comprises an increasingly nar-
row part of the wholesale electric markets. The price squeeze doctrine
has not been applied to the wholesale "coordination" markets, which
comprise mostly trades of power between "non-captive" utilities.49 It is
the coordination markets that have grown substantially over the past
two decades50 and that have demonstrated increasingly-competitive
characteristics.
Ironically, then, most of FERC's attention to price discrimination
has been devoted to a doctrine of price squeeze developed in an era of
little wholesale competition in the electric industry. Moreover, FERC
attempted to apply antitrust concepts in the context of a ratemaking
model that does not contemplate competition, in order to protect compe-
tition in markets where its presence and desirability were marginal at
best. Not surprisingly, the effort has been strongly criticized on these
45 46 F.E.R.C. 61,853 (1989).
46 Id.
4' The "competition" for retail customers allegedly occurs in the one area of elec-
tricity regulation that has typically been dominated by state sanctioned, franchised mo-
nopolies and where general competition is viewed as least likely to occur, and poten-
tially inefficient should it occur. See id. (Stalon, Comm'r, dissenting); Joskow, Mixing
Regulatory and Antitrust Policies in the Electric Power Industry: The Price Squeeze
and Retail Market Competition, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION 173 (F. Fisher ed.
1985).
48 These utilities tend to refer to themselves as "Transmission Dependent Utili-
ties" (TDUs). See Utah Power & Light, 45 F.E.R.C. at 61,291 n.165, 61,310.
49 Conceptually, this would also include sales to utilities by non-utility generators.
;0 Today, about 38% of all Kwh sold to end users under regulation have previ-
ously been traded at least once in the wholesale market. ENERGY INFORMATION AD-
MIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, FINANCIAL STATISTICS OF SELECTED UTILITIES, Pub-
lic. Doc. No. DOE/EIA-0437(86).
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grounds.51
FERC's effort to develop a workable analysis of the complex and
far more important question of price discrimination in previously regu-
lated markets experiencing some level of deregulation is embryonic at
best. Its first serious effort to confront the issue in the natural gas area
was strongly criticized by Commissioner Stalon, who attempted to set
forth standards for evaluating price discrimination.52 As yet, FERC has
not significantly broadened the focus of its price discrimination analy-
sis;53 however, that development is probably inevitable as wholesale
competition develops.
2.2.2. Essential Facilities
At first blush, the "essential facilities" doctrine would seem to
have considerable significance in the natural gas and electricity indus-
tries, which are widely viewed as strong "natural monopolies," at least
in part, with "bottleneck" characteristics in the transmission and trans-
portation functions. However, partly because of this natural monopoly
status, while the wholesale supply markets were tightly regulated, mo-
nopoly control over the transmission and transportation functions was
viewed as necessary to the orderly development of these industries and
was sanctioned by the regulatory agencies.54 The need to open up ac-
cess to bottleneck transportation/transmission facilities for competing
suppliers, if the competition that had begun to develop in these markets
was to be fair and efficient, became evident. Nevertheless, the regula-
tory agencies found that they had limited direct authority to mandate
greater access by competing suppliers. Nevertheless, FERC, spurred by
incremental legislative deregulation of natural gas production,55 has
moved to encourage open access to gas pipelines through a complex
package of administrative reforms.56 These reforms condition certain
51 See supra text accompanying notes 45-47. See also DOJ Price Squeeze Com-
ments, supra note 29.
52 Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 35 F.E.R.C. % 61,231 (1986) (Stalon, Comm'r,
dissenting).
" For instance, FERC has not yet acted on the April 1987 petition of the
Cogeneration Coalition of America, Inc. asking FERC to declare illegal under section
210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1982),
the growing practice of electric utilities offering industrial customers rate discounts in
exchange for those customers agreeing to defer or cancel decisions to self-generate
through cogeneration. Cogeneration Coalition of America, Inc., No. EL87-34-000
(April 28, 1987).
"' See C. Stalon, Opportunities and Risks in Regulating the Rejuvenated Natural
Gas Industry (unpublished manuscript).
" Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-432 (1982).
5' FERC Order Nos. 380, 436, 500, supra note 15. This approach was essentially
endorsed by the reviewing court in Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981
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liberalizations of pipeline regulation on "voluntary" grants of access to
other suppliers by the pipelines.
FERC has moved cautiously in the electricity industry despite
well-developed theories that FERC could order access to remedy undue
discrimination in ratemaking.5" However, FERC recently advanced the
essential facilities doctrine in a surprising context - FERC review of
utility mergers and acquisitions. 8 In Utah Power & Light, a proposed
merger between two Pacific Northwest utilities would have given the
surviving utility sufficient control of bottleneck transmission facilities to
monopolize the interregional wholesale markets between the Pacific
Northwest and California. 9 As a condition of approving the merger,
FERC required that the merged entity meet stringent transmission ac-
cess conditions on its system.60 The companies accepted these
conditions.
Because transmission access is central to the debate over competi-
tion in these industries, and especially to the creation of competitive
markets that would justify relaxing economic regulation in the whole-
sale area, transmission access is likely to be the focus of reform debates
in the near future. The degree to which it will be introduced through
the more traditional antitrust essential facilities doctrine, as in Utah
Power & Light,6" as opposed to regulators' reform initiatives, is less
clear.
2.2.3. State Action
Because major parts of the electric power and natural gas indus-
tries are subject to both rate and market entry regulation at the state
level, the state action doctrine has played, and may continue to play, a
significant role. This doctrine is based on principles of federalism and a
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
17 See, e.g., Reiter, Competition and Access to the Bottleneck: The Scope Contract
Carriage Under the Federal Power and Natural Gas Acts, 18 LAND & WATER L.
REV. (1982).
11 The doctrine had also received some support in FERO approval of two agree-
ments between Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (PG&E) and two of its wholesale partial
requirements customers, the Modesto and Turlock Irrigation Districts. In these agree-
ments, PG&E agreed to firm transmission access in exchange for relief from some of
the traditional regulation of its relationship with these customers. See Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co., 42 F.E.R.C. 61,406 (1988); 43 F.E.R.C. 61,403 (1988); 44 F.E.R.C. %
61,010 (1988). The reasoning behind the doctrine is playing an increasing role in
FERC analyses of the "market power" of entities seeking liberalization of rate regula-
tion, primarily because of the central role control over transmission assets plays in such
analyses. See, e.g., Public Service Co. of Indiana, 49 F.E.R.C. % 61,346 (1989).
11 Utah Power & Light, 45 F.E.R.C. at 61,284, 61,286.
60 Id. at 61,291.
61 Id. at 61,284, 61,287.
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1943 Supreme Court decision that the Sherman Act,62 was directed at
"individual not state action" and reveals no congressional intent to pro-
hibit states from imposing restraints on competition.63
The parameters of this doctrine, which creates an exemption from
federal antitrust liability, have been the subject of considerable judicial
development. Two major Supreme Court cases in the 1980s have-re-
fined its scope. In California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v.
Midcal, 4 the Court found that California's statutorily-sanctioned re-
sale price maintenance scheme for the wholesale wine trade did not
afford state-action immunity to producers from vertical and horizontal
price fixing liability under the Sherman Act. While the first require-
ment for immunity, a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
goal of state policy," was met, the second requirement, that "the policy
must be 'actively supervised' by the state itself," was not.65 The State
"simply authorize[d] price setting and enforce[d] the prices established
by private parties"; it "neither establishe[d] prices nor review[ed their]
reasonableness."66 Nor did the State monitor the program or engage in
any "pointed reexamination" of it.6 7 The Court found that "[t]he na-
tional policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such
a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a price-fix-
ing arrangement."68
This conclusion, coupled with the Court's citation with apparent
approval of an earlier decision, which appeared to require that the an-
ticompetitive conduct "be compelled by direction of the State acting as
sovereign,"6 9 led some observers to conclude the doctrine had been dras-
tically reduced in scope. Furthermore, the Court in another prior deci-
sion,70 which was cited in Midcal, ruled that no immunity was con-
ferred "when a state agency passively accepted a public utility's
tariff.""1
However, in Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v.
United States, the Court found that state statutes authorizing but not
compelling collective ratemaking, which were intended to displace price
competition, immunized joint rate setting by private motor carriers. 2
62 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
63 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943).
64 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
65 Id. at 105.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 106.
68 Id.
69 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975).
70 Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 578, 579 (1976).
71 Midcal, 445 U.S. at 104.
72 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
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Because this private activity could be attributed to a "clearly articulated
state policy," it passed muster under the first prong of the Midcal
test;73 and there was no dispute that there was adequate state supervi-
sion to satisfy the second prong.
7 4
Furthermore, anticompetitive conduct need not be specifically
sanctioned by a state legislature to trigger immunity. It is sufficient if
a state "clearly intends to displace competition in a particular field with
a regulatory structure" and if the conduct is sanctioned by "an an-
ticompetitive regulatory program."7 6 This is particularly significant for
energy regulation, where such "anticompetitive programs" abound.
Hence, the state action doctrine retains special vitality in the area
of economic regulation. Its application is likely to continue to test judi-
cial ingenuity as competition develops within segments of the electric
and natural gas industries still subject to rigorous regulation, especially
where the pro-competitive policies of the federal antitrust laws and
some federal regulatory programs conflict with traditional state eco-
nomic regulation. The doctrine, unlike its Canadian counterpart,7 7 ap-
plies only to actions of the states. It is "an attempt to resolve conflicts
that may arise between principles of federalism and the goals of the
antitrust laws - unfettered competition in the marketplace." 8 How-
ever, analogous approaches could develop towards conflicts between
federal antitrust law and federal regulatory programs. Most federal ec-
onomic regulation statutes contain provisions speaking specifically to
the role of the antitrust laws, and the judiciary usually strives to avoid
finding conflicts between statutes passed by the same legislative body. 9
Therefore, those asserting that anticompetitive conduct is sanctioned by
a federal statute that partially repeals the antitrust laws would have a
heavy burden to meet.
Whether an analogous doctrine should apply to foreign commerce
has recently been debated. The DOJ's Antitrust Enforcement Guide-
lines for International Operations recognize "foreign sovereign compul-
sion" as "an implied defense to application of the U.S. antitrust laws"
to the acts of foreign governments, but only in a specified range of cir-
cumstances, where the anticompetitive conduct is actually "compelled
73 Id. at 61.
' That, presumably is the basis for distinguishing Cantor, where the regulatory
oversight was too passive to meet the test.
75 Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 63-64.
76 Id. at 64-65.
77The regulated conduct defense is discussed infra part 3.1.
71 Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 61.
11 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-55 (1963); Cali-
fornia v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 484-85, 487-88 (1961).
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by a foreign sovereign."80 It is not as broad as the state action doctrine,
which also extends to cases of "clearly articulated state policies" that
are "subject to active state supervision," although in such circum-
stances, "considerations of international comity may lead the [DOJ] not
to challenge the conduct in question."8
Because the FTA essentially leaves the structure and substance of
domestic federal and state or provincial energy regulation intact in each
country,8 2 and does not itself effect changes in or harmonize either
country's antitrust or competition laws, the state action doctrine should
remain largely unaffected by the FTA. The only conceivable effect is
that the national treatment provision requiring states to afford treat-
ment to Canadian imports "no less favorable" than that accorded do-
mestic goods, 3 could displace state regulation because this provision
has been interpreted as importing a non-discrimination standard."
However, since most state economic regulation schemes have similar
standards proscribing "undue discrimination," it appears improbable
that a state action issue would arise in this context. Cases of discrimi-
nation against Canadian goods are more likely to be addressed directly
as violations of Article 502 of the FTA than to be attacked under the
U.S. antitrust laws.
2.2.4. Non-price Predation
While U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies no longer view price
predation as a seriously credible threat to competition, certain forms of
non-price predation are receiving increasing attention. 8 Broadly de-
80 53 Fed. Reg. 21,584 (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 22,426 (1988).
81 The American Bar Association (ABA) strongly criticized the DOJ's draft of the
Guidelines, which had rejected the notion of recognizing foreign sovereign compulsion
as a defense. The ABA had argued that both precedent and sound policy support appli-
cation of a defense as broad as a doctrine analogous to state action. A.B.A. Sec. Anti-
trust L. & A.B.A. Sec. Int'l Trade & Practice, Report on Draft Antitrust Guidelines
for International Operations, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 651, 668-69 (1988) [hereinafter
ABA on Draft Guidelines]. After the reversal of the DOJ's position on nonrecognition
of any defense in the Guidelines, the ABA's criticism is more muted, but it continues to
argue for a broader "foreign-regulated conduct" defense. A.B.A. Sec. Antitrust L. &
A.B.A. Sec. Int'l Trade & Practice, Analysis of Department of Justice Guidelines for
International Operations, Antitrust Enforcement Policy (Final Version), 57 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 957, 966-68 (1989) [hereinafter ABA on Final Guidelines].
82 Three exceptions, two of which relate primarily to import and export regula-
tion, are contained in Annex 905.2 of the FTA.
" FTA, art. 502.
84 Battram & Lock, supra note 4, at 352-53.
85 See generally Rule, Claims of Predation in a Competitive Marketplace: When
is an Antitrust Response Appropriate?, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 421 (1988) (This paper
was contributed to a panel entitled "North American Competition Policy" at the 1988
Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association in Toronto.); Calvani, supra note
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fined, non-price predation encompasses any strategic behavior designed
to increase a rival's costs.86 However, the current regulatory focus is on
the abuse of governmental and regulatory processes to raise a rival's
costs, both the direct costs of the regulatory process and the indirect
costs caused by regulatory delays that exacerbate business uncertain-
ties.8" One example of such strategic behavior would be opposing a ri-
val's pipeline certification request at every step of the regulatory pro-
cess. Another example would be first asserting that a project is not
needed and subsequently filing an application for a similar project, sug-
gesting that the original opposition was based on frivolous grounds.
Regulatory agencies cannot proscribe such predatory behavior un-
less the rather narrow "sham" exception to the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine applies. The essence of that doctrine is that lobbying or other
efforts by businessmen to obtain legislative or executive action, however
anticompetitive in intent or effect, are exempted from antitrust liability
as the exercise of the constitutional right to petition or otherwise engage
in political activity.8" The Supreme Court eventually extended the No-
err-Pennington doctrine to administrative and judicial processes in Cal-
ifornia Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,89 with essentially
the same rationale - that the right of access to the courts and to ad-
ministrative agencies is part of the right to petition. However, the
Court in Trucking Unlimited also firmly established the "sham" excep-
tion, which had been recognized in dictum in Noerr. That exception
draws a delicate conceptual line between using the decisional process to
influence a government agency, which Noerr-Pennington protects, and
using it "to bar [a] competitor from meaningful access" 90 to the govern-
ment, thereby subverting the decisional process.
While this distinction is conceptually elegant, it will be extraordi-
narily difficult to apply in practice in the context of economic regula-
tion. The courts usually find a "sham" more readily where illegal,
fraudulent, or other unethical means accompany the effort to petition
government or where the public official is himself a co-conspirator. In
such cases, the integrity of the decisional process itself is undermined.
However, in the regulatory non-price predation context, such clarity is
17, at 283-88.
88 Rule, supra note 85, at 423-26.
87 Id.
88 Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. 365 U.S. 127
(1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). See generally Busi-
NESS ORGANIZATIONS - ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION (MB) § 46
(1989)(general discussion of state action immunity).
89 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
90 Id. at 512.
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rare. Allegations of excessive use of procedural challenges, or unduly
burdensome discovery to delay a competitor's application, are more
common. As most agency processes have intrinsic protections against
such excesses,91 a complainant must allege that the agency afforded the*
defendant an excess of due process at the expense of the complainant's
rights. Few regulatory agencies would embrace such complaints with
enthusiasm.
Two possible avenues exist to deal with non-price predation in the
regulatory context:
(1) Direct FTC investigation and prosecution. 2 This could involve sen-
sitive issues of evidence and proof that would require a regulatory
agency to lay bare its procedural interstices, which would probably
cause considerable inter-agency tension.
(2) FTC advocacy of regulatory agency self-policing against non-price
predation.93 Similarly, a quasi-judicial agency as anxious to grant plen-
tiful due process as is FERC, is unlikely to take up such a challenge
enthusiastically. Nevertheless, the FTC filed an intervention with
FERC in 1987, suggesting that FERC curtail undue procedural oppo-
sition to pipeline certification applications by handling such opposition
through such means as summary proceedings.94 The FTC also urged
that FERC treat with "appropriate . . . skepticism" a series of argu-
ments, ranging from increased costs to customers to environmental con-
cerns, raised by competing pipelines to a proposal by Texas Gas to
expand pipeline capacity to serve a distribution company exclusively
served by one of the intervening competitors.95 While FERC did not
directly respond to the FTC's arguments, it did recite them in some
detail in its order.96 FERC also rejected most of the intervenors' argu-
ments that the FTC had debunked; and it approved the Texas Gas
proposal, as likely to increase competition.97 FERC's treatment of this
issue, in an era in which regulatory delay is an increasing obstacle to
the creation of more efficient, competitive markets,98 may portend the
" FERC's discovery rules, for instance, follow the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure's discovery rules quite closely. See 18 C.F.R. §§ 395.401-.411 (1989).
9 Calvani, supra note 17, at 287.
I d.
9' Motion of FTC Staff for Leave to Intervene, In re Texas Gas Transmission
Corp., FERC No. CP87-205-000 (July 30, 1987).
" Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 46 F.E.R.C. 61,010, at 61,044-45 (1989).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 61,054.
98 See Stalon, Comments on Due Process for Regulated, But Weak, Natural Mo-
nopolies, 29 ABA UTIL. SEC. NEWSLETrER, No. 2, at 2 (1989); C. Stalon, Future
Tension Points in Federal-State Natural Gas Regulation, Address at ABA Section of
Public Utilities Law Symposium on the Future of Natural Gas Regulation (Apr. 22,
1988).
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debut of another chapter in a growing saga of interaction between eco-
nomic regulation and the antitrust laws.
3. ENERGY DEREGULATION AND THE PROTECTION OF
COMPETITION IN CANADA
3.1. Competition and Energy Markets in Canada
The evolution of competition in energy markets in Canada has
taken place against a constitutional and regulatory background mark-
edly different from that of the United States. Consequently, Canadian
energy markets are of interest more by way of contrast to the U.S.
markets than by way of comparison.
The Competition Act99 is the general legislation governing compe-
tition in Canada. Part V provides that the following acts, inter alia, are
criminal offenses: conspiracies to lessen competition, 00 bid rigging,1"1
predatory pricing,"' misleading advertising,10 3 or price maintenance. 0
Part VII contains non-criminal provisions involving refusals to deal, 0 5
consignment selling,106 exclusive dealing, tying, and market restric-
tion,"0 7 abuse of dominant position, 0 8 delivered pricing,'09 and merg-
ers." 0 These non-criminal matters are subject to review by the new
Competition Tribunal, 1 but only on the application of the Director of
Investigation and Research (the Director) appointed 1 under the Com-
petition Act.
The Director is responsible for enforcing both the criminal and the
non-criminal provisions of the Act, 1 3 and is authorized to intervene
before federal"1 or provincial" 5 regulatory agencies to advocate the
Act's pro-competitive policy. 1 Private civil action is preserved not-
"' R.S.C., ch. C-34 (1985).
100 Id. at § 45(1).
101 Id. at § 47(2).
102 Id. at § 50.
103 Id. at § 52.
104 Id. at § 61.
105 Id. at § 75.
106 Id. at § 76.
107 Id. at § 77.
108 Id. at § 78.
109 Id. at § 80.
110 Id. at § 92.
111 Competition Tribunal Act, ch. 26, 1986 Can. Stat. 853. The Competition Tri-
bunal was established in 1986.
12 Competition Act § 7.
113 Id. at pts. I, VII.
114 Id. at § 125.
115 Id. at § 126.
116 Id. at § 1.1.
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withstanding criminal prosecution."' The Act provides civil redress for
persons injured by conduct prohibited by Part VI, but damages are
limited to losses actually suffered.""
The heavy regulation of energy markets in the 1970s and early
1980s and the preoccupations that drove regulation precluded any
meaningful advocacy of competition in energy regulatory processes.
The Director's criminal enforcement activities were also limited by the
"regulated conduct defense."" 9 This judicially-created defense applies
to activities or conduct regulated pursuant to federal or provincial legis-
lation if the regulator has exercised authority over the activity or con-
duct in question. Essentially, the defense is that the general public in-
terest in competition has been superseded by a legislative scheme in
which the particular conduct or activity is subject to a different public
interest standard. However, as energy markets are deregulated and in-
creasingly exposed to competition, the role of the Competition Act, and
therefore of the Director, in maintaining and encouraging competition
grows in importance. The increasing importance of the Competition
Act must be considered by those who have not yet needed to consider
the application of the Act to activities in energy markets. To under-
stand the role of the Director, one must appreciate that the Director
seeks to administer and enforce the Competition Act in the context of
the prevailing energy policy, which is established by others.
Competition is now the established policy for buying and selling
oil and natural gas. In March 1985, the Government of Canada
reached a historic agreement with the Governments of the Provinces of
British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan: the Western Accord. 20
This agreement, which deregulated crude oil marketing and pricing,
contemplated the need to achieve a market responsive policy for mar-
keting and pricing natural gas. The Western Accord was followed later
in the same year by the Agreement on Natural Gas Markets and
Prices' 2 ' between the same four governments.
Restrictive crude oil export policies have been abandoned. All
crude oil is moving to the export market under short-term orders issued
117 Id. at § 62.
1l Id. at § 36.
... Attorney General of Canada v. Law Society of British Columbia, 1982 2
S.C.R. 307; Regina v. Canadian Breweries Ltd., 1960 O.R. 601; In re Farm Products
Marketing Act, 1957 S.C.R. 198.
120 Western Accord, Mar. 28, 1985 (agreement among the Governments of Ca-
nada, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia on oil and gas pricing and taxa-
tion) (text published by Energy, Mines and Resources Canada).
12 Agreement on Natural Gas Markets and Prices, Oct. 31, 1985 (agreement
among the Governments of Canada, Alberta, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan)
(text published by Energy, Mines and Resources Canada).
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under the National Energy Board Act (NEB Act).' 22 These orders are
issued on a non-restrictive basis and are not limited as to volume or
price.'23 Essentially, the National Energy Board (NEB) has reduced its
regulatory activity to a monitoring function.
Pipeline capacity is the primary limitation on transporting oil to
the marketplace. 4 In this environment, fair access to scarce pipeline
capacity is essential to competition. This issue is not, however, new. Oil
pipelines are common carriers and must transport all oil offered for
transmission.' 25 The apportionment of space among all those wanting
service is an issue whenever the demand exceeds the pipeline capacity.
Trade in electricity presents a rather different picture. Electric
power in Canada is generated and distributed domestically almost en-
tirely by provincial utilities. The market is not currently competitive to
any significant extent, although there are the beginnings in Ontario, for
example, of independent power production by such means as cogenera-
tion. The Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources has announced a
new policy on electric power exports, providing for less scrutiny of elec-
tric power export applications under the NEB Act. Public hearings will
be required only in limited circumstances, such as where there is con-
cern about the ability of Canadians in neighboring provinces to obtain
power on fair terms. Generally, electric power exports will be subjected
to limited scrutiny and routinely approved.' 26
The new electric power export policy illustrates nicely the distinc-
tion between establishing the conditions for a competitive market and
loosening federal export restrictions. Under the new policy, the produc-
ing province will continue to regulate its electricity production and dis-
tribution as before and will continue to decide when and to what extent
it will export power. The change is simply that the federal government
will not intervene in an export transaction except under special
12 National Energy Board Act, CAN. REV. STAT., ch. N-7, pt. VI (1985) [herein-
after NEB Act].
.23 National Energy Board Act, amendment, SOR/DORS/85-390, 119 Can. Gaz.
pt. II, no. 10 (1985).
1"4 For example, Interprovincial PipeLine (IPL), a division of InterHome, which
transports Alberta oil east to the United States and eastern Canada, is experiencing
capacity constraints. New pipeline capacity will require approval under the NEB Act.
The ultimate test of the need for new capacity will be the ability of the market to
generate revenues to support the cost of the construction. IPL, for example, has recently
completed a phased expansion of its line, increasing capacity by about 400,000 barrels
a day at a cost of Cdn. $350 million. The next 200,000 barrels a day will require a full
system expansion at a cost of Cdn. $1.1 billion. ENERGY ANALYSIS, May 16, 1988 &
ebruary 27, 1989.
" NEB Act § 71(1).
120 ENERGY, MINES AND RESOURCES CANADA, CANADIAN ELECTRICITY POLICY
(1988).
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circumstances.
The Agreement on Natural Gas Markets and Prices was intended
to create the conditions for a competitive natural gas market. The
Agreement recognizes that, even when a functioning competitive gas
market is achieved, the market will not be completely deregulated.
Transportation of gas will remain subject to regulation.12
In Canada the means of transportation of gas between and among
the provinces are operated under almost complete monopoly conditions.
The large commitment of capital required for major pipeline projects,
the efficiency of a uniform system, and other social issues arising from
pipeline construction suggest that significant unregulated pipeline con-
struction is unlikely to occur.
Given the regulated character of the means of transportation, the
facilitation of competition in the buying and selling of natural gas
called for by the Agreement must be a fundamental principle of gas
pipeline regulation. It is here that the Director, as a statutory advocate
of competition, has a role to play.
Two issues have been fundamental to the position of the Director
on gas pipeline regulation. First, there must be open access to transpor-
tation from the producer to the ultimate consumer. If consumers are to
have the benefit of competitive gas purchases, they must have direct
access to gas supplies. Otherwise, gas prices will be subject to the dis-
torting influence of provincial regulation. Likewise, if producers are to
have the benefit of competitive gas sales, they must have direct access to
final consumers. Otherwise gas sales will be subject to the distorting
influence of a market in which there are only a few very large
customers.' 28
Second, given that sellers of gas often control the means of trans-
portation, sales activities must be clearly separated from transportation
activities. This separation is necessary to prevent the transporter from
cross-subsidizing competitive activities from the regulated business, or
giving its own gas preferential treatment. Separation can be achieved
through many methods, but the objective is always the same, preventing
anti-competitive behavior.
Regulating pipelines in a manner consistent with the competitive
gas market is not sufficient in itself to achieve competition. In Canada,
the gas trade is subject to divided federal and provincial jurisdiction.
127 Agreement on Natural Gas Markets and Prices, supra note 121, at T 4.
128 In that regard, the Ontario end use market of some 800 Bcf per year-the
largest market east of Alberta-is almost entirely divided between three local distribu-
tion companies (LDCs). In Quebec there is one single franchised LDC of note. In
Manitoba there are two LDCs, which operate under common control.
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Therefore, policies and practices at the federal and provincial levels
must be in harmony. Producing provinces must permit the removal of
gas, and consuming provinces must permit the entry of gas into local
distribution systems, under conditions not conflicting with the objective
of competition. Furthermore, federal practices must not restrict compe-
tition. This harmony has not yet been achieved.
A commitment to competition requires a commitment to permit-
ting supply and demand to respond to free market forces. It involves the
recognition and acceptance of risks as well. One would think that a
country that has been a net exporter since 1983 of all energy commodi-
ties"2 9 - crude oil, natural gas, electricity, coal, and uranium - could
make such a commitment. It cannot be said, however, that all govern-
ments in Canada have wholeheartedly embraced competition in energy
markets.
Following the Agreement on Natural Gas Markets and Prices, the
federal government amended the Energy Administration Act 13 0 to elim-
inate mandatory regulation of natural gas prices in interprovincial and
international trade. In addition, various regulations and orders made
under the Energy Administration Act were revoked. 3' The federal gov-
ernment thus substantially withdrew from the regulatory field.
The NEB, which had traditionally determined the surplus of nat-
ural gas available for export in a formulistic manner based on long-
range forecasts, has adopted a market-based procedure for approving
gas exports.' 32 This procedure is premised on the ability of gas pur-
chasers to purchase required supplies under competitive conditions and
on the balancing of supply and demand in response to competitive mar-
ket forces.
The Alberta government has not loosened its regulatory regime to
the same extent. The Agreement on Natural Gas Markets and Prices
contemplated end users acquiring gas directly from producers through
open access to connecting transportation systems. It was recognized that
such direct sales would displace gas sold to local distribution companies
(LDCs) under existing long-term contracts.' 33 The Agreement does not
129 ENERGY, MINES AND RESOURCES CANADA, THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT AND ENERGY, AN ASSESSMENT 7 (1988).
130 Energy Administration Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. E-6 (1985), amended by ch.
39, 1986 Can. Stat. 1265.
131 Energy Administration Act Sections 53 to 63 Non-application Order 1986,
SOR/DORS/86-1049.
132 NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD, REVIEW OF NATURAL GAS SURPLUS DETERMI-
NATION PROCEDURES (1987). This review was undertaken at the request of the Minis-
ter of Energy, Mines and Resources Canada. Id. at 1.
133 Agreement on Natural Gas Markets and Prices, supra note 121, at 1 7.
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restrict end users from choosing the direct sales option.
However, the Alberta government interpreted the Agreement to
restrict the circumstances under which end users may exercise this di-
rect. sales option. These restrictions are enforced through the removal
permit process.'3 The effect was to segment the market, resulting in
substantially lower prices in the industrial markets than in other end-
use markets. 13 5 More recently, Alberta has argued that long-term con-
tracts are essential for security of supply to residential, institutional,
and commercial end-users, and that direct sales that provided
equivalent security to long-term contracts with LDCs may be permit-
ted.136 The Alberta policies are designed to prevent the erosion of pro-
ducer and provincial royalty revenues that would result from free
competition.
The lesson learned by Alberta producers is that regulated markets
provide stability and that regulation can bring about social and eco-
nomic consequences different from those produced by competitive mar-
kets. While other standards may support Alberta's action, it cannot be
justified by competitive standards alone.
Another lesson is that, in a federal system where the policies of a
province such as Alberta... can affect market outcomes in other prov-
inces, the federal government's withdrawal from regulating the field
may be insufficient to achieve a competitive market. Instead, the federal
government may have to continue to occupy the field with the object of
actively creating and fostering competitive markets. The weight of fed-
eral authority may be essential to counteract provincial interests, which
can threaten the implementation of policies of benefit to the nation as a
whole. Inter-governmental agreement has been, and probably will con-
tinue to be, the avenue for progress on natural price deregulation and
other competition issues.
The NEB cannot and will not pronounce on this issue. While it
has considerable statutory authority over pipelines, the NEB has no
power to regulate the prices at which gas is bought and sold in inter-
134 Gas Resources Preservation Act, ch. G-31, 1984 Alta. Stat. 157, amended by
ch. 17, 1986 Alta. Stat. 315. Section 19 of the Act prohibits the removal of gas from
Alberta without a removal permit. The position of the Alberta government was re-
viewed in MANITOBA PUBLIC UTILITIES BOARD, REPORT ON THE IMPACT ON MANI-
TOBA CONSUMERS OF DEREGULATION OF NATURAL GAS PRICING IN CANADA §§ 4.1,
4.7 (1987) [hereinafter MANITOBA PUBLIC UTILITIES BOARD 1987 REPORT].
... MANITOBA PUBLIC UTILITIES BOARD 1987 REPORT, supra note 134, at § 3.
136 The Ontario Energy Board has rejected this view. ONTARIO ENERGY BOARD,
1988 REPORT OF THE BOARD, E.B.R.L.G. 32.
137 Alberta is the major source of gas for eastern Canada, with all Alberta gas
moving to eastern markets through the TransCanada PipeLine system.
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provincial trade, 8' and no power over the production of gas or its re-
moval from a province. 3 9 Moreover, the initiative towards competition
was taken, as discussed, by agreement between federal and provincial
governments. The NEB, unlike FERC, has not initiated change and
has confined itself to interpreting and implementing the policies flowing
from the Agreement on Natural Gas Markets and Prices.' 40 The NEB
can do little to influence Alberta government policy.
3.2. Enforcement of the Competition Act
The regulated conduct defense has limited the Director's ability to
enforce the criminal provisions of the Competition Act. However, as the
scope of regulation is reduced, activities previously protected by the de-
fense may become subject to the Competition Act. While this is an easy
principle to assert, the application of the Competition Act in the pre-
sent state of energy regulation in Canada is a complex matter.
A number of factors affect the availability of the defense. First, the
Alberta government limits consumer choice in a competitive market as
a matter of public policy. This policy is given legal force through the
removal permit process and the prohibition on removing gas from the
province without a permit.' 4 ' A prosecution under the Competition Act,
or an application to the Competition Tribunal, would surely fail if the
defendant or respondent could demonstrate that he failed to meet the
Competition Act's requirements to avoid transgressing Alberta law.
Second, the Alberta policies directly affect the workings of the
market since they determine the terms under which, and influence the
price at which, Alberta gas may be bought and sold. This makes the
identification and analysis of possibly anti-competitive behavior
difficult.
Third, the availability of the regulated conduct defense in an envi-
ronment where a regulatory framework exists, but the regulator fore-
bears from exercising authority, or exercises it in a passive way, is un-
clear. Federal regulation of gas prices has ceased only because of an
order 42 declaring the non-application of various Energy Administra-
tion Act provisions. The federal government can reintroduce the regula-
tory machinery at a moment's notice if desired. The question is
138 Saskatchewan Power Corp. v. TransCanada PipeLines Ltd, 1981 2 S.C.R.
688.
a The Constitution Act, 1987, amended by SI/87-11 § 92A.
'~ NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD, TRANSCANADA AVAILABILITY OF SERVICES
(1986).
11 Gas Resources Preservation Act § 19.
142 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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whether the absence of action implies a current determination as to the
public interest or whether the field is unoccupied, permitting the suc-
cessful operation of the Competition Act. Even more difficult is the case
of passive regulation, 4" in which, as in the case of oil exports, authori-
zations are given on a non-restrictive basis. In other words, the field is
only partially occupied. The difficulty is the result of Canadian crimi-
nal law jurisprudence, which, unlike U.S. state action doctrine, suggests
the availability of the defense where the regulator exercises general au-
thority over a matter, even if the regulator does not specifically address
the aspect that is at issue.
Fourth, the application of the defense outside of the criminal law
context to practices reviewed by the Competition Tribunal is unclear.
In broad terms, the argument that the public interest, as reflected in a
particular regulatory scheme, supersedes the general scheme of the
Competition Act has force. At the same time, the Competition Tribunal
does not impose punishments. Its jurisdiction is remedial in nature.
Thus, it is exercising concurrent jurisdiction with regulatory authori-
ties, giving way only in the face of specific and conflicting decisions of
the authority having specific jurisdiction in the matter. This argument
is, in the absence of jurisprudence, speculative.
3.3. Merger Review
The Competition Act contains important new merger provisions.
Since June 1986, when the Director began to actively review merger
activity under the Competition Act, the oil and gas industry has had
one of the highest levels of merger activity.'
The Competition Tribunal, on application by the Director, may
dissolve a merger if it would likely lessen competition substantially. In
making this determination the Tribunal must consider a number of
factors:' 45
(1) The extent to which foreign products or competitors provide, or are
likely to provide, effective competition;
143 The Federal Court of Appeal has held that, where a statute requires such
matters as the filing of rates, the regulator may shape its requirements in light of com-
petition in the market, but cannot, because some competition exists, absolve a company
of the requirement to file its rates. See Telecommunications Workers' Union v. CRTC,
98 N.R. (FCA) 93 (1989).
1" Notable are the acquisition of Bow Valley Industries Ltd. by British Gas
PLC, the acquisition of Encor Energy Corporation by TCPL Energy Limited, the
acquisition of Sulpetro by Esso Resources, and the acquisition of Dome Petroleum
Limited by Amoco Canada Petroleum Company Ltd.
145 Therefore, the Director should consider these factors as well prior to making
an application to dissolve a merger.
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(2) The existence of any barriers to entry into a market, including both
tariff and non-tariff barriers to international trade, or any regulatory
barriers to trade;
(3) Whether the business of a party to a merger has failed, or is likely
to fail;
(4) The extent to which acceptable substitutes for products supplied by
the parties to the merger are, or are likely to be, available; and
(5) The extent to which the market would remain competitive follow-
ing the merger.
One should note that a determination that a merger will be anti-
competitive cannot be based solely on evidence of market share or in-
dustry concentration. In addition, the negative effects of the merger on
competition must be weighed against any gains in efficiency resulting
from the merger. In weighing efficiency, any likely increase in exports,
or any likely substitution of Canadian products for imports, must be
considered.146 The introduction of export considerations into this
calculus reflects the importance to Canada of the ability of Canadians
to compete in international markets, even at the expense of lessening
competition within Canada. The rationale is that Canadians benefit
from more efficient world-class enterprises able to expand export sales.
The Director's approach to mergers is compliance-oriented. The
Competition Act provides for notification of mergers to the Director,
providing the Director with an opportunity to review the merger and
determine whether it will comply with the Competition Act. If the Di-
rector has concerns about the legality of the merger, he will seek to
resolve these concerns with the affected parties, perhaps resulting in
some restructuring of the transaction. The Director may also monitor
the merger for a period of time to determine if it will have anti-compet-
itive effects; the Competition Act provides a three year limitation period
for challenging a merger. Where serious and contentious issues are
raised that cannot be otherwise resolved, the Director may apply to the
Competition Tribunal for an order preventing or dissolving the
merger. 
1 7
The acquisition of a business involving foreign investment may at-
tract the attention of Investment Canada, 48 as well as that of the Di-
rector. Investment Canada currently reviews direct acquisitions involv-
ing assets of at least five million Canadian dollars and indirect
acquisitions involving assets of at least fifty million Canadian dollars.
Investment Canada will consult with the Director with respect to com-
14' Competition Act §§ 92(2), 93, 96.
147 Id. at §§ 92(1), 97.
148 Investment Canada Act, ch. 20, 1985 Can. Stat. 419.
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petition issues. However, Investment Canada is not bound to reject a
proposed acquisition merely because the Director assigns it a negative
weight. Investment Canada looks at the broad net benefit to Canada of
the investment. At the same time, the Director is not bound by any
Investment Canada assessment. The merger provisions of the Competi-
tion Act apply even if a foreign acquisition of a Canadian business has
been approved by Investment Canada. Consequently, a U.S. purchaser
of a Canadian business, in addition to obtaining any required Invest-
ment Canada approval, should also ensure that the Director will not
challenge the transaction on competition grounds.
4. CONCLUSION: THE BILATERAL CONTEXT - HARMONIZATION
OF DOMESTIC LAWS AND THE UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE-
TRADE AGREEMENT
4.1. Comparison of the Domestic Antitrust Regimes in Energy
Despite the coexistence for close to a century in the United States
and Canada of the two oldest domestic antitrust/competition law re-
gimes, the evolution of these regimes in each country in the regulated
energy area reveals some striking differences. Some are products of dif-
ferences in the antitrust/competition laws themselves: the statutory
scheme, judicial evolution, and the enforcement mechanisms.' 49 Some
are the product of differences in the regulatory regimes for energy in
both countries, although those differences have diminished dramatically,
philosophically if not institutionally, over the last five years. Perhaps
the most striking difference is in the institutional responsibility for anti-
trust monitoring and enforcement in each country.
In the United States, FERC began in the late 1980s to assume a
far more active role in applying antitrust and regulatory standards
designed to serve antitrust goals, as competition developed, pursuant to
a judicially enunciated statutory charter to protect competition in its
jurisdictional markets.' 50 In Canada, deregulation of energy markets
has been achieved largely through federal/provincial agreement and co-
operation with regulatory action taken at both the federal and provin-
cial levels in the context of policies emanating from these agreements.
149 See generally Goldman, Bilateral Aspects of Canadian Competition Policy, 57
ANTITRUST L.J. 401 (1988).
..0 Such a trend is not yet evident in state economic regulation of energy, under
which a good deal of the state sanctioned monopoly power, especially of electric utili-
ties, has developed. Indeed, one of the cutting edges of the state action doctrine has been
the protection of such state prerogatives against the pro-competitive force of the U.S.
antitrust laws. As the importance of competition is increasingly accepted by state regu-
lators, this general picture may change.
[Vol. 11:2
https://scholars ip.law.upenn.ed /jil/vol11/iss2/5
U.S.-CANADA TRADE/ANTITRUST
Another interesting comparison is between the intervention role
exercised by the Director in Canadian federal and provincial regulatory
proceedings and the similar role of the DOJ and the FTC in U.S.
federal and state regulatory proceedings. In both countries, that role
has been asserted selectively and sporadically. However, in the United
States, the courts have assumed a greater role than in Canada. Indeed,
in areas such as price squeeze, the'interaction between FERC and the
courts has been tense.151 This has usually, but not always,152 occurred
in the context of a court reviewing an agency action, rather than in an
antitrust enforcement context.
The bifurcation of antitrust decisional authority in these regulated
industries in the United States has not gone without criticism. At least
one leading commentator has asserted that FERC should exercise ple-
nary and exclusive authority and that the courts should be limited to an
agency review role.' 53 On the other hand, the potential for direct court
involvement could create healthy tension, inducing the regulatory
agency to do its antitrust job more rigorously.' 54 Whichever pattern
prevails, FERC is starting to ask broader antitrust questions as part of
a broader market structure analysis as it considers reforming its regula-
tion of oil pipelines, natural gas pipelines, and electric power utilities to
meet new market realities.
The power of the provinces in Canada over energy regulation is
greater than that of the states .15  However, the scope of the Canadian
1 See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271 (1976); As-
sociated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
... In City of Mishawaka v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 560 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir.
1977), the Court of Appeals entertained an antitrust action for price squeeze in the
regulated electric power area and refused to defer to the alleged primary jurisdiction of
the FPC over the matter.
153 R. Pierce, Remarks at the Second Annual Conference on Electricity Law and
Regulation, American Bar Association, Denver (Mar. 13-14, 1989) [hereinafter ABA
Electricity Conference].
154 See, e.g., R. Cudahy, Justice, U.S. Court of Appeals (7th Cir.) at ABA Elec-
tricity Conference, supra note 153.
155 For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court has struck down natural gas producing
state "ratable take" regulations as preempted by the partially-deregulated post-NGPA
federal statutory scheme and FERC's regulation of rates thereunder. Transcontinental
Gas PipeLine Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409 (1986). Of special signifi-
cance to evolving competition and deregulation in the U.S. energy markets, the Court
rejected arguments that NGPA deregulation of wellhead markets created a void that
state regulation could fill. Such a "federal decision to forgo regulation in a given area
may imply an authoritative federal determination that the area is best left unregulated,
and in that event would have as much preemptive force as a decision to regulate." 474
U.S. at 422. (quoting Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 375, 384 (1984)) (emphasis in original). In Canada, in contrast, there is no com-
parable preemptive decision limiting the powers of producing provinces. In fact, the
Canadian Constitution now contains guarantees of the legislative competence of the
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regulated conduct defense is less well defined than that of the U.S. state
action doctrine.' 56 The judicial vitality of the latter is symptomatic of
the continual pressure of U.S. antitrust laws on state regulation.
A final striking contrast between the Canadian and U.S. antitrust
regimes is the limited role privately-instituted suits can play under Ca-
nada's statutory scheme and the largely unlimited role permitted in the
United States under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. 157 While private suits
in the United States tend to build upon DOJ or FTC initiatives, they
can become the cutting edge of judicial development, especially where
government enforcement is relatively inactive. There is already some
evidence of this in the natural gas area. In the regulated energy area in
general, Section 4 suits could become a significant complicating factor
in any effort to create a rational, cohesive structure of antitrust enforce-
ment and monitoring between federal and state antitrust law enforce-
ment and federal and state economic or production regulation. Such
suits could likewise complicate the creation of any such structure be-
tween the FTC and the DOJ, and the regulators and the courts.'58 In
Canada, this prospect appears to pose less of a threat to the cohesive-
ness of an already less complex enforcement structure.
4.2. Harmonization of the Bilateral Antitrust! Competition Regimes
for Regulated Energy Industries under the FTA
The FTA says much about liberalization of trade but very little
about harmonization of antitrust laws.' 59 Canadian and U.S. antitrust
laws have pursued similar objectives, albeit in different ways, for nearly
a century. The objectives of antitrust laws are compatible with the goal
of fair competition envisaged by the FTA.' Indeed, the antitrust and
competition laws and the FTA are essentially complementary. The pri-
mary focus of the former is, in fact, fair competition in domestic mar-
kets, while the latter deal with international trade between those
markets.
Notwithstanding some differences in approach to antitrust issues
provinces in this area. See supra note 139.
"' Neither of the state action doctrine requirements, a sanctioning by state policy
of the anticompetitive conduct and active supervision by the state agency, are as clearly
defined under the regulated conduct defense. See supra part 3.2.
15 U.S.c. § 15 (1982).
U8 Professor Pierce, for instance, views the existence of the private right of action
as inimical to the development of a rational antitrust and regulatory scheme in this
area. See supra note 153.
'5 See Battram & Lock, supra note 4, at 382-84; Schultz, supra note 4.
160 FTA, art. 102(b). One of the objectives of the FTA is to "facilitate conditions
of fair competition within the free-trade area." Id.
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in Canada and the United States, there is no reason to believe the two
regimes cannot continue to coexist with reasonable comfort in the free
trade environment. On the whole, there has been relatively little con-
flict between the Canadian and U.S. governments on antitrust matters,
especially in light of the huge trade relationship between two countries
with strong, competitive private sectors and long traditions of antitrust
enforcement. Moreover, mechanisnis predating the FTA have been es-
tablished to provide for consultation and the exchange of
information. 6'
The FTA leaves the energy regulatory regimes of each country
intact'62 and establishes a consultation mechanism in the event one
country's regulations are perceived to discriminate against the other
country's energy goods in violation of the FTA.' 6' Differing approaches
to energy regulation may present a greater challenge to harmonious
energy trade than any differences in approach to antitrust enforcement.
The controversy over FERC Opinion 256 (the "as billed" decision) 6
indicates the impact regulatory decisions will continue to have on the
two countries' energy trade.
However, the growing interdependence of the domestic and world
economies and the need to maintain international competitiveness are
putting pressure on antitrust standards, which have tended to focus
only on the domestic economy. The Canadian Competition Act already
recognizes international competition as a factor in assessing mergers."6
A merger having the effect of lessening competition to some extent in
Canada may be found acceptable if the scale of the enterprise is neces-
sary to compete effectively at the international level.' 66 Any resulting
tendency towards concentration in the energy industries should at least
be offset by, and probably exceeded by, the tendency of domestic energy
deregulation towards increasing the opportunities of smaller enterprises
to produce and market energy.
Similar changes may be introduced into U.S. antitrust laws. The
present asymmetry in the level of recognition is, however, not likely to
be a serious issue in energy trade between the United States and Ca-
.61 Battram & Lock, supra note 4, at 383-84.
162 The FTA contemplates a few specific changes in particular policies or regula-
tions, as specified in Chapter 9.
16 FTA, art. 905.
164 See supra note 9. See also Battram & Lock, supra note 4, at 384-87.
185 Competition Act §§ 1.1, 96.
166 Id. To somewhat similar effect is the Investment Canada Act, which includes
the effect on competition amongst its criteria for review of proposed foreign invest-
ments. Investment Canada Act, ch. 20, § 20(d). See also Kennish, Developments in
Canadian Competition Law Affecting U.S. Investments in Canada, 57 ANTITRUST
L.J. 459, 482-83 (1988).
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nada. Moreover, the current DOJ position that potentially legitimizing
actions of foreign governments should only in limited circumstances be
recognized by U.S. courts as defenses in determining antitrust liability,
through exemption doctrines such as act of state,167 is under attack and
apparently on the retreat.
6
1
This article has not dealt with the complex relationship between
the antitrust and competition laws and the international trade laws of
the two countries, especially their antidumping (AD) and counter-
vailing duties (CVD) laws;' 69 nor the all important relationship of the
AD and CVD laws to the future of the FTA.17 0 However, two points
emerging from these relationships are critical to the future relationship
between the U.S. antitrust and Canadian competition laws in the en-
ergy area:
(1) Under the FTA, Canada and the United States are to establish a
Working Group "to develop more effective rules and disciplines" for
government subsidies and a "substitute system of rules for dealing with
unfair pricing, and government subsidization, '17 some of the major
167 The act of state doctrine essentially states that the courts in one country will
not sit in judgment of the acts of another government within that government's terri-
tory. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
168 The DOJ's Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations,
supra note 80, would substantially limit applications of the state action or Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrines in the international arena and would narrowly apply the act of state
doctrine in the context of extraterritorial conduct that otherwise violates the antitrust
laws. As noted supra Part 2.2.3, these proposed guidelines were strongly criticized by
the ABA. ABA on Draft Guidelines, supra note 81, at 664-71; ABA on Final Guide-
lines, supra note 81, at 965-69. See also Rosenthal, Antitrust Implications of the Ca-
nada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 485, 493-95 (1988).
See generally Griffin, The Impact on Canada of the Extraterritorial Application of
the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 435 (1988).
"6' See generally Rosenthal, supra note 168. See also The Interface of Tradel
Competition Law & Policy, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 397 (1987)(papers presented at the
1987 annual meeting of the American Bar Association); Task Force Report on the
Interface Between International Trade Law and Policy and Competition Law and
Policy, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 462 (1987).
In addition to countervailing duty and antidumping actions available to protect
U.S. producers from unfair international competition under sections 701 and 731 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673 (1982), Canadian trade may be subject to
action under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 on the grounds of unfair competition
among private competitors. Moreover, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411 (1982), provides for retaliation against government unfair trade practices. Sch-
ultz, supra note 4, at 9. These trade remedies have also been left untouched by the
FTA, and while neither type of action has played a role in past energy trade, one
cannot rule out the use of either in the future, as competition in energy markets in-
creases. Actions under section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 against imports that are a
substantial cause of serious injury to a U.S. domestic industry have been curbed insofar
as Canada is concerned by chapter 11 of the FTA. This provision requires that imports
must be substantial and contributing importantly to the serious injury alleged.
170 See generally Battram & Lock, supra note 4, at 348-49, 375-79.
171 Id. at 384 (quoting FTA art. 1907, 111 1(a), 1(b)).
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pieces of unfinished business in the FTA. The success of the Working
Group, which is given five to seven years to complete its task, is impor-
tant to the long-term success of the FTA. The energy chapter of the
FTA contemplates that government incentives will continue to maintain
the oil and natural gas reserve base. However, no express immunity
from AD or CVD laws is given to energy goods. The harmonization of
AD and CVD practices is therefoie important in the energy area.
(2) In the negotiations that led up to the conclusion of the FTA, one
proposal was that the AD laws should be abandoned altogether and
that cross-border price discrimination should be dealt with by each
country's antitrust or competition laws, suitably amended to apply to
sales in both countries under essentially similar standards. While that
proposal was not accepted, it is still a potential approach for the Work-
ing Group, whose efforts are intended to fill a major gap left by the
FTA negotiations.
These points emphasize the close relationship between the domes-
tic antitrust and competition laws and reform of the AD and CVD
laws under the FTA. One commentator has asserted that the Working
Group, which "provides an extraordinary opportunity for melding the
concerns of trade and competition law," might itself become an instru-
ment for harmonization and rationalization in the bilateral context of
the two countries' domestic antitrust and competition laws.' 72
In view of the importance energy played in the final negotiations
of the FTA, how antitrust and competition law and enforcement devel-
ops in the regulated energy context in each country could have an im-
portant influence on future FTA implementation and Working Group
negotiations. That development may in turn be significantly influenced
by FTA implementation and the outcome of these negotiations.
172 See Rosenthal, supra note 168, at 488, 492-93.
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